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Abstract 
 
This paper addresses whether the often-bemoaned loss of unity of knowledge 
about humans, which results from the disciplinary fragmentation of science, is 
something to be overcome. The fragmentation of being human rests on a couple 
of distinctions, such as the nature-culture divide. Since antiquity the distinction 
between nature (roughly, what we inherit biologically) and culture (roughly, 
what is acquired by social interaction) has been a commonplace in science and 
society. Recently, the nature/culture divide has come under attack in various 
ways, in philosophy as well as in cultural anthropology. Regarding the latter, 
for instance, the divide was quintessential in its beginnings as an academic dis-
cipline, when Alfred L. Kroeber, one of the first professional anthropologists in 
the US, rallied for (what I call) the right to ignore—in his case, human nature—by 
adopting a separationist epistemic stance. A separationist stance will be under-
stood as an epistemic research heuristic that defends the right to ignore a specif-
ic phenomenon (e.g., human nature) or a specific causal factor in an explanation 
typical for a disciplinary field. I will use Kroeber’s case as an example for mak-
ing a general point against a bias towards integration (synthesis bias, as I call it) 
that is exemplified, for instance, by defenders of evolutionary psychology. I will 
claim that, in principle, a separationist stance is as good as an integrationist 
stance since both can be equally fruitful. With this argument from fruitful sepa-
ration in place, not just the separationist stance but also the nature/culture di-
vide can be defended against its critics. 
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1. The epistemic fragmentation of the human 
If we are lucky, we experience ourselves as a unity—as human beings. Yet, the 
moment in which the phenomenon of “being human” is transferred to science, 
this unity gets lost. In the disciplinary differentiated science of today, this unity 
has no home. As an epistemic object (i.e., an entity studied by sciences) human 
beings get lost. They literally disappear on their way to science. The 
phenomenon of “being human” becomes cut into pieces, apportioned, 
fragmented—into an evolved human nature, a culture, an immune system, a 
neuronal system, a mind, a society, etc. Through this epistemic fragmentation (as I 
call it) humans become epistemically “available” for science, but not as humans. 
In this sense, there is no unitary account of being human, no anthropology in 
the all-inclusive sense, no simple answer to what it means to be human in 
contemporary science. Evolutionary thinking, anthropology, sociology, 
psychology, history, philosophy, etc.—provide separate fragments of 
knowledge about humans, with often complex relations among the fragments.  
This epistemic fragmentation of the human has often been judged negatively, 
first and foremost for existential and metaphysical reasons. What is lost is a 
unitary Menschenbild, a meaningful picture of (and vision for) humans. Such a 
unified picture of being human would provide an ultimate answer to who and 
how we are (and should be), a picture that would have to be synthesized out of 
the bits and pieces offered by the multitude of sciences, even if it would 
simultaneously transcend the bits and pieces by its existential or metaphysical 
orientation. Secondly, independent of the need that some might still feel for an 
existential or metaphysical vision for being human, the fragmentation of “being 
human” can be criticized on the basis of epistemic reasons, namely by stressing 
that it prevents us from gaining valuable scientific knowledge about humans 
(Menschenkenntnis). This epistemic issue is the subject of this chapter.1  
Mary Midgley (1995: xxv-xxvi), for instance, in her introduction to a new 
edition of her Beast and Man (1978), deplores the “sharp division[s] between 
mind and body, between culture and nature, between thought and feeling.” 
According to her, these conceptual splits are “the bad side of our inheritance 
from the Age of Reason” and the foundation for the epistemic fragmentation of 
the human. She writes:  
 
In modern times, science, because of its tremendous prestige, has been 
invoked to dramatize all these splits in a way that often has little to do with 
                                            
1 I take the distinction between view/knowledge (Menschenbild/Menschenkenntnis) from 
Mühlmann (1986 [1948]: 140). See Birken-Bertsch (2013) for the issue about losing a unified pic-
ture of being human. This paper is based on ideas first presented in Kronfeldner (2010) and 
Kronfeldner (2013).  
 3 
any real scientific work, but that seems to bring an unanswerable authority 
to the side that can exploit it. This … adds a damaging warfare between the 
“two cultures” to the general chaos, deepening the gaps already opened by 
specialization between different studies and generally fragmenting the 
intellectual scene in a way that wastes endless time and resources. (ibid.)  
 
For Midgley, the gaps she mentions are unquestionably negative—because of 
the motivation for them and because of their consequences for producing 
knowledge about humans. Conceptual dichotomies such as the nature/culture 
divide are bad since they have to do with claiming authority (for detail, see 
Kronfeldner forthcoming) and because they lead to a waste of time and 
resources. In a similar vein, Clifford Geertz, in a famous paper “The impact of 
the concept of culture on the concept of man,” criticized, in the name of a 
“synthetic view,” what he calls “the “stratigraphic” conception of the relations 
between biological, psychological, social, and cultural factors in human life.” 
He writes:  
 
In this [stratigraphic, MK] conception, man is a composite of “levels,” each 
superimposed upon those beneath it and underpinning those above it. As 
one analyzes man, one peels off layer after layer, each such layer being 
complete and irreducible in itself, revealing another, quite different sort of 
layer underneath. (Geertz 1973: 37)  
 
Like Midgley, Geertz mentions the quest for disciplinary autonomy and 
authority as reason for the attractiveness of the stratigraphic view. Both critics 
focus on the divide having a pragmatic function as a symbolic autonomy and 
authority securing device between scientific fields or disciplines, a function 
Kronfeldner (forthc) calls epistemic demarcation, and both regard the 
consequences as detrimental.  
Ontologically the nature/culture divide can be justified, despite critique, be 
it from Midgley, Geertz or from developmental systems theory. It can be 
defended since there are differences among developmental resources in the 
world that allow us to successfully use the nature-culture divide to denote two 
different kinds of developmental resources traveling over time in distinct 
channels of inheritance. In the following, I thus assume that the nature/culture 
divide is ontologically meaningful.2 What I aim to defend here is that the 
                                            
2 A detailed defense of this has to wait for another occasion.  
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nature/culture divide can also be epistemically useful.3 To do so, I will use the 
example of Alfred L. Kroeber, student of Franz Boas, who hardened the nature-
culture divide to have the right to ignore one side of it, namely nature. 
According to him, nature and culture are separate evolutionary processes. 
Because of that, the cultural anthropologist can safely ignore nature. Kroeber 
had, I will claim, epistemically the right to ignore nature since to do so was 
epistemically fruitful.4  
The argument is roughly the following: First and foremost, Midgley and 
Geertz forget that (whatever the motivations of those using it) the divide was 
fruitful in establishing and keeping an autonomous cultural anthropology alive, 
the very perspective from which they criticize the divide. Second, they seem to 
implicitly or explicitly not allow for a separationist stance—the right to 
ignore—as an epistemically fruitful research strategy, a heuristic. Interestingly, 
they share this with their most ardent contemporary critics, namely 
evolutionary psychologists, who challenge the autonomy of cultural 
anthropology (and other social sciences and humanities). Evolutionary 
psychologists do the latter by arguing for unity, i.e., an integration of 
knowledge about humans, to overcome the epistemic fragmentation of being 
human. As part of this call for integration, they despise social scientists who 
(like Kroeber) take a separationist stance.  
In the following section, I shall illustrate the evolutionary psychologist’s 
argument from integration against what these call the standard social science 
model, i.e., any model that entails claims towards the autonomy of social 
sciences on the basis of the separation of nature from culture (and society). I 
will reply with an argument from fruitful epistemic separation. 
 
 
2. The argument from integration  
Outlining why social scientists should pay attention to the insights of 
evolutionary psychology, Jerome Barkow, Leda Cosmides, and John Tooby 
write:  
 
Conceptual integration generates this powerful growth in knowledge 
because it allows investigators to use knowledge developed in other 
disciplines to solve problems in their own. … At present, crossing such 
                                            
3 Some critics of the divide mention that pragmatically it can be useful; for example, Tim Lew-
ens (2015: 91-2). Yet, even Lewens does not spell out the ontology that allows the pragmatic use 
in detail nor describe the details of the pragmatic use.   
4 I use the term “the right to ignore” in analogy to William James’ (1897) appeal to a “right to 
believe.”  
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boundaries is often met with xenophobia, packaged in the form of such 
familiar accusations as “intellectual imperialism” or “reductionism.” But by 
calling for conceptual integration in the behavioral and social sciences we are 
neither calling for reductionism nor for the conquest and assimilation of one 
field by another. … Conceptual integration simply involves learning to 
accept with grace the irreplaceable intellectual gifts offered by other fields. 
To do this, one must accept the tenet of mutual consistency among 
disciplines, with its allied recognition that there are causal links between 
them. Compatibility is a misleadingly modest requirement, however for it is 
an absolute one. Consequently, accepting these gifts is not always easy, 
because other fields may indeed bring the unwelcome news that favored 
theories have problems that require reformulation. (Barkow et al. 1992: 12-13) 
 
Nobody involved in serious contemporary scholarly debates about evolution 
and culture asks for any kind of reductionism that would involve giving up the 
disciplinary structure of science and the pluralism that follows from that 
(compatible but incongruent perspectives), not even evolutionary psychologists, 
at least not Barkow et al. (1992), it seems. The disciplinary structure of science is 
a bulwark against any call for imperialist unification via ontological, theoretical, 
or methodological reduction of social sciences to biological ones.5  
Barkow et al. do not ask for any of these kinds of reductions or for 
imperialism; they ask for corrective integration, which is a process (and research 
strategy) of creating or checking for external consistency, consistency between 
one’s own theory and fields external to one’s own. One should note that 
integration is less global than unity since the perspectives or fields which are 
integrated stay separate and are not reduced, but they are integrated, connected, 
and consequently constrain each other. The constraining or correction can have 
a direction. When we check whether a theory from one field of studies is 
consistent with a theory from another field, and then adapt the one according to 
its conflicts with the other, then we integrate the corrected theory to the 
correcting theory. Thus integration can have a direction of adaptation. In effect, 
Barkow et al. ask cultural anthropologists to make sure that what they claim is 
consistent with well-established knowledge from evolutionary theory, while 
considering their version of evolutionary psychology as providing the new 
“irreplaceable intellectual gifts” to be taken into account. 
Interestingly, at least in the quote from above, this corrective consistency-
checking integration goes vice versa (i.e., the corrective direction goes both 
ways). Barkow et al. do not assume a corrective asymmetry between disciplines; 
                                            
5 See Mäki (2014) on what imperialism in these contexts can mean.  
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they ask for corrective symmetry, for mutual integration.6 Corrective asymmetry 
would mean: while the historian, sociologist or anthropologist will have to 
correct her theories when these conflict with evolutionary theory, the biologist 
does not have to correct anything just because a social scientist finds out 
something about this or that behavior that conflicts with evolutionary theory. 
And why is that, one might ask? “Because biology is more fundamental, more 
general,” or so the argument might go. Claims for a corrective asymmetry 
probably rest on an implicit hierarchical ordering of scientific disciplines, from 
physics, to chemistry, to biological sciences, to psychology, to social sciences—
an ordering that is often derived from a so-called layer-cake model of reality 
(often associated with Oppenheim & Putnam 1958). I am no fan of a corrective 
asymmetry between disciplines, but will not develop an argument against it 
here.7 The focus shall rather be on the value of integration. My argument against 
the value of integration holds even if there were corrective asymmetries 
between disciplines.  
The reason integration is regarded as good in the above plea for integration 
from Barkow et al. is that it is believed to be fruitful (i.e., generative): leading to 
new insights, theories, or even fields. Yet there seems to be a further 
assumption, even if it is only implicitly made in the quote. Barkow et al. seem to 
assume that integration and generativity (i.e., the production of new insights, 
new methods, or new theories representing whole new interdisciplinary fields) 
are so closely connected that therefore separation cannot be fruitful. This is what 
I label the argument from integration.  
That they entertain this argument from integration (and even should do so 
for their own consistency) can be deduced from the context of the quotation: the 
explicit enemies of their text are people like Kroeber, involved in the 
development or defense of what Barkow et al. call the “standard social science 
view,” a view that ignores any evolutionary explanations of our behavior, and 
thus exhibits what I call a separationist strategy. Barkow et al. bring in the 
fruitfulness of integration to argue against Kroeber and scientists like him.  
Made explicit, the argument from integration is: anthropologists should not 
ignore human nature in their explanations since otherwise generativity is lost. 
Social scientists in general should always aim at integration: they should correct 
their views in face of the knowledge in other fields because this secures the 
generativity of research (i.e., the production of novel, reliable, justified beliefs). 
                                            
6 I owe the term “corrective symmetry” to Steel (2004), though he uses it in slightly but philo-
sophically decisively different ways.  
7 One would have to deal with reduction and the concept of a hierarchy of levels, which are 
intricate concepts that would lead us to far away. See Wimsatt (2007) and Brooks (forthcoming) 
instead.  
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But Barkow et al. can argue against Kroeber and the like in this way only if it is 
indeed the case that the latter’s separationist stance has failed to be generative. 
And this is the assumption that I will criticize. A view that claims that only 
integration can be generative suffers from (what I call) a synthesis bias.8 The 
argument from integration is biased regarding the historical cases since it 
disregards the actual historical fruitfulness of the separationist stance. 
A similar synthesis bias might surface in the assumptions of the direct critics 
of evolutionary psychology. John Dupré (2010), for instance, allying himself 
with the developmental systems perspective, criticizes evolutionary 
psychologists for ignoring culture. Even though I agree with Dupré on most of 
his points against evolutionary psychologists, I shall develop a path between 
these polar positions. The argument is that it can be fruitful for both sides to 
ignore certain phenomena or causal factors and to thus utilize a nature/culture 
divide to establish a division of labor (and thus disciplinary primitives) in the 
explanation of what we are, think, and do.  
The argument that I want to establish—the pragmatic-pluralist argument 
from the fruitfulness of epistemic demarcation—is that, in principle, separation 
(as a heuristic research strategy) can be as fruitful as integration; whether it is 
fruitful depends on context. Separating oneself in the sense of assuming 
disciplinary primitives—not in willfully accepting known inconsistencies, but in not 
checking for consistency—can have fruitful potential. If integration is valued 
because it encourages progress, then separation has to be taken as equally 
valuable if it encourages progress. To use an analogy: as evolutionary theory 
showed us that geographic isolation can be a creative factor in the evolution of 
species, this paper aims to show that epistemic demarcation can be a creative 
factor in the evolution of disciplines and theories.  
 
3. The argument from fruitful separation 
To argue against the synthesis bias, it is sufficient to establish that separation 
can be equally fruitful. Thus, one example of a separationist stance that has 
been fruitful is all that is needed. I will present Kroeber’s above mentioned case 
as such an example, i.e., as a separationist stance that was epistemically fruitful.  
                                            
8 I owe the idea of comparing integration and separation as values to a short piece from Gerald 
Holton (1978), who shows that in the history of science en gros, synthesis has often been valued 
more than analysis, even though both should be regarded as being of equal value since sciences 
need both for progress. Oppenheim & Putnam (1958: 16) are another example for synthesis bias. 
They wrote that the unity of science should be a working hypothesis since it “is, as has often 
been remarked, fruitful in the sense of stimulating many different kinds of scientific research. 
By way of contrast, belief in the irreducibility of various phenomena has yet to yield a single 
accepted scientific theory.” This claim was unjustified already in 1958.  
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The case of Kroeber’s cultural determinism 
Kroeber was Franz Boas’ first PhD in anthropology and the ninth in the whole 
US. He became famous at the beginning of the 20th century, when anthropology 
emancipated itself from a museum-based profession to an academic discipline. 
At that time, anthropologists were not alone in maturing as a science, a process 
which includes: asking for money, jobs, and institutional as well as intellectual 
power. Psychology and the expanding field of genetics were their most 
prominent competitors at that time. Kroeber was very engaged in the respective 
disciplinary “identity politics” and developed what has been called a radical 
“cultural determinism.”9 His case shows how—through the reconstitution of a 
field-defining phenomenon: culture—certain phenomena or causal factors can 
be made epistemically irrelevant.  
Kroeber defended the identity and importance of cultural anthropology by 
using the biologist’s own concept of heredity: he defined culture as heredity of 
another sort that is, at the same time, opposed to biological heredity. He moved 
from an analogy (culture as heredity) to a contrast: biological heredity (nature) 
versus cultural heredity (culture). Culture derives from previous culture, as a 
cell derives from previous cells, and (as we would add today) bits of DNA 
derive from previous bits of DNA. Since culture derives from previous culture 
it is autonomous from cells and biological heredity. This move helped him not 
only to establish the autonomy of cultural change from biological evolution, but 
also the identity and autonomy of those studying cultural change, which he 
termed (interchangeably) historians or anthropologists.  
As Figure 1 nicely illustrates, there is not one evolution of organisms 
anymore, but three: the evolution of superorganic culture, of organic evolution, 
both contrasted with physical persistence (of stones, for instance, which do not 
reproduce and die, but persist and thus do not evolve). The evolutionary 
process is partitioned into three separate and autonomous processes. There are 
a couple of epistemic aspects of this separation of distinct evolutionary 
processes that need to be taken seriously:  
• Kroeber partitioned one phenomenon (being human and the evolution of 
being human) into three distinct autonomous processed.  
• He thereby established a new separate explanandum, namely culture. 
Culture is not explaining life or the evolution of organisms; it is to be 
explained, i.e., it is the new field-defining explanandum for the new 
specialist on stage, the cultural anthropologist.  
                                            
9 His case has historically been analyzed in detail in Kronfeldner (2009) and Jackson (2010). 
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• As part of this, nature becomes a disciplinary primitive: one can safely 
assume it and then ignore it since it does not make a difference for the 
historical change in culture that the cultural anthropologist aims to explain 
and that is depicted in Figure 1 with its characteristic take-off (change of it 
without a concomitant change in nature).  
 
 
 
Figure 1: From Kroeber’s famous paper “The superorganic” (1917: 211). It depicts three distinct 
and autonomously changing evolutionary processes: superorganic culture (dotted line) on the 
top, organic evolution (dashed line) and physical persistence (continuous line) beneath. 
 
To think this way was far from trivial and quite fruitful to fight the 
scientific racism of the time. To understand why, we have to look at the 
importance and history of Lamarckian inheritance and the history of the 
concept of culture in more detail. Herbert Spencer (1893, 1894) famously argued 
for the necessity of Lamarckian inheritance to explain the evolution of musical 
sense and higher cognition generally. According to Spencer, there could not be 
a being like Mozart in Samoa, an example August Weismann (1892) used, 
because people in Samoa cannot have the same musical sense as people of 
Mozart’s “kind” and “time,” simply because if they do not have the same kind 
of music they do not have the same kinds of musical minds. Given Lamarckian 
inheritance, this was a valid inference. Spencer assumed that one can directly 
infer respective natural differences from cultural differences (and vice versa) 
since nature becomes culture, which becomes nature in turn, ... prohibiting the 
take off one sees in Kroeber’s figure. In a Lamarckian picture, nature and 
culture are one indivisible system of inheritance and evolution.  
On the basis of a Weismannian point of view, however, one could not infer 
racial differences from cultural differences since the two are independent, 
decoupled from the very first moment when the first animal managed to learn 
socially from another one, i.e., from the very “birth” of culture (B in the figure). 
Since Lamarckism is wrong, as Weismann stressed, there can be a Mozart in 
Samoa, i.e. it is an empirical possibility that there can be a human being in 
Samoa with the same cognitive capacities as the real historical Mozart. Kroeber 
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used Weismann’s claims to not only fight racism but to also establish the 
autonomy of cultural anthropology.10  
Both, Weismann and Kroeber believed that only if Lamarckian inheritance is 
replaced with the concept of cultural inheritance is one able to maintain (a) that 
cultural change is historically not correlated with biological change, i.e. that one 
can change without the other and is autonomous in that sense. There is then 
also (b) no evidence to not believe in the psychic unity of humankind—if all one 
has is access to cultural differences and that is all one had at that time since 
genetic factors were still hypothetical entities only. Therefore, from Weismann’s 
and Kroeber’s perspective the unity of humankind could safely be assumed, i.e. 
taken as a base line on top of which culture “takes off.” If so, then (c) cultural 
change and differences are to be explained by cultural change and differences, 
rather than by a shared human nature. 
It is important to acknowledge that with this decoupling Kroeber did not 
deny that there is a shared human nature as well as individual natures (i.e., 
differences in nature between individual people) that are important to explain 
each individual’s behavior. He only (c.i.) denied that individual innate 
differences are important for what he wanted to explain–shared culture–since 
they average out at the cultural (i.e., group) level, and (c.ii) stressed that the 
shared human nature does not make a difference for cultural differences at the 
group level either since culture changes and differs on the basis of a shared 
human nature. 
As a consequence, nature is a disciplinary primitivum, a phenomenon taken 
for granted, on top of which culture happens. And this holds despite the fact 
that at the individual level of development, nature and nurture certainly 
interact. But the individual level (explaining behavior of humans) is not the core 
explanandum anymore, and the co-evolution of nature and culture, of 
biologically and socially inherited developmental resources, was not yet an 
explanandum.  
Kroeber epistemically reconstituted what “culture” means, he reconstituted 
the explanandum in the following sense.  
                                            
10 Although important, I have totally left out a discussion of how further political and social 
dimension entered Kroeber’s felt need for boundary work, i.e., how industrialization, democra-
cy, capitalism, imperialism and the regulatory control of behavior involved in the “disciplining” 
of humans played a role. I did so deliberately since it would by far exceed the space available 
here. Useful entry points for this are Ross (2003) or Patterson (2001). One thing is important to 
note, though: It has often been stressed, that the Vienna Circle’s rally for a unity of science had a 
political motivation, against the nationalism and racism of the early 20th-century Europe. Kroe-
ber had the same political enemies but the exact opposite epistemic strategy to beat them. Thus, 
even if political contexts play a role, “we will not find […] a single-valued, transhistorical func-
tion that plots assessment of unity onto a fixed political map,” as Galison (1996: 8) already stat-
ed. 
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1. “Culture” referred to traits of a group of people (playing the role of an 
explanandum) in the classic 19th century evolutionist picture of 
anthropologists such as Edward B. Tylor, irrespective of how these traits are 
caused.  
2. It predominantly referred to factors in development, playing a role as part of 
the explanans for explaining behavior in Boas’ work, who reformed 
anthropology in many senses.  
3. With Kroeber, “culture” became a system of inheritance, a new explanandum 
in its own right that is explained by previous culture, analogous to biological 
inheritance.  
4. Finally, on the basis of this, culture recently became a factor in evolution (as 
part of the explanans in contemporary co-evolutionary theory) to explain—
not behavior as such, but evolution of behavior.11  
 
How to evaluate his case 
How shall we evaluate this case in terms of epistemic fruitfulness? I introduced 
epistemic fruitfulness as generativity, which is regarded by Barkow et al. (and 
many others) as an epistemic value, something a theory should exhibit. 
Generativity of a perspective (or approach, theory, model, etc.) consists in the 
production of new insights, new methods, or new inter-field theories 
representing whole new interdisciplinary fields. A new insight can be positive 
or negative, i.e., producing new knowledge or establishing the dismissal of 
wrong beliefs. 
(a) A new insight: Even though people defended (and still defend) scientific 
racism (let alone racism) on all kinds of grounds, I regard Kroeber’s claim of the 
autonomy of culture as a historically important insight that helped to fight the 
false scientific racism of the early 20th century, which was supported by the 
belief in the inheritance of acquired characteristics. Thus, Kroeber developed an 
important and fruitful thesis that blocked one argument pattern for scientific 
racism of that time.  
(b) New field with new methods: Kroeber’s analogy between culture and nature 
as two systems of decoupled inheritance was not used for integration but for 
separation: of culture from nature, and of the alleged experts studying these, i.e., 
cultural anthropologists on the one hand, and physical anthropologists plus 
                                            
11 For details on this dialectic history of the concept of culture, see Kronfeldner (2009). For more 
on changing the explanandum from explaining individual development of a trait to explaining 
differences between individuals, see Kronfeldner (2015).  
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geneticists on the other hand.12 Kroeber, as mentioned, did not want to say that 
physical anthropologists or geneticists do not have a word to say on humans. He 
believed that science is fruitful only if each of these has a domain of its own. In 
the context of his time, I believe, he was right: it certainly was more fruitful at 
that time that each had a domain of his own in order to establish a field within 
science that has produced a tremendous amount of knowledge essential to 
understand what humans are, think, and do.  
(c) Precursor of new interfield: Since Kroeber used the concept of distinct 
channels of inheritance, he can be considered as a precursor of contemporary 
dual or multiple inheritance theories studying the co-evolution of nature and 
culture, i.e., the evolutionary interaction of the two systems of inheritance.13 
These theories go beyond Kroeber since they indeed integrate in an interactive 
sense what became separated in Kroeber’s hands. These theories are also in and 
of themselves quite productive, in at least three senses: in contrast to 
approaches such as evolutionary psychology, they can show in a statistical 
manner how biologically maladaptive behavior can evolve on the basis of 
specific cultural transmission settings; they can also show that different modes 
of learning (individual learning, prestige bias, conformist bias, success bias, etc., 
all settings analogous to the biological mechanisms of heredity) lead to different 
macro-evolutionary patterns; they finally can describe the evolutionary 
interaction of nature and culture, e.g., how settings about legal inheritance and 
cultural learning influence the probability that a trait such as lactose tolerance 
(widespread, for instance, in Northern but not Southern Europe) can evolve.14  
Kroeber ignored that nature and culture interact as factors in the evolution of 
humans since for him culture was first and foremost an explanandum. In 
contemporary co-evolutionary theory, culture takes on a different epistemic 
role: it is regarded as part of what explains evolution (a part of the explanans), 
rather than as a system of inheritance that is explained (explanandum). Kroeber 
was working at a different time and had to first separate what later became 
kinds of causes for a more general explanandum (co-evolution). Culture and 
nature thus have become—with but also beyond Kroeber—not just separate 
systems of inheritance but special kinds of causal factors in the evolution of 
human traits, be these traits physical or mental. In his own time, Kroeber 
regarded nature and culture not just as separate but he ignored any possible 
                                            
12 With psychologist and sociologist also studying something different. For the separation of 
sociology and anthropology see the paper that Kroeber wrote together with Talcott Parsons 
(1958).  
13 See Boyd & Richerson (1985) as an instance of the first, and Jablonka & Lamb (2005) as an 
instance of the second. For comparison and general analysis, see Lewens (2015).  
14 For more on the productivity of multiple inheritance theories, see Kronfeldner (2013).  
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interaction of them on a longer time scale, too focused on fighting the enemy of 
his time: scientific racism, which did not allow for culture to change 
independently of nature. That Kroeber’s perspective is today too radical does 
not conflict with the claim that his separationist stance was quintessential for 
the historical development described in this paper and justified given the 
generativity it exhibited.  
 
 
4. Summary of the case and two arguments established 
To summarize: Kroeber defended the place of cultural anthropology against the 
social and political hegemony of racist hereditarianism and the scientific force 
of the new genetics. He crossed the boundary between anthropology and 
biology and used Weismann’s theory of heredity, at a time when both 
disciplines were expanding their scientific and institutional setting. The goal of 
the boundary crossing was however to make the boundary ‘fences’ between the 
two disciplines even higher. He did this in order to establish a clear 
specialization, a differentiation, i.e., a clear division of labor—divide and 
conquer—between anthropology and biology, and between physical 
anthropology and cultural anthropology. When disciplines emerge, it is 
unlikely that their representatives are open-minded, for pragmatic reasons: they 
have to establish themselves first and secure a place in the midst of other 
disciplines. They have to appropriate phenomena.  
The case shows that, as research strategies, integration and separation can 
both lead to fruitful scientific results. I named three such results for Kroeber’s 
case of separating culture and nature as two different systems of inheritance. 
The separationist stance has been fruitful, since:  
 
a)  it helped to block one detrimental argumentation pattern for racism in early 
20th-century, 
b)  it helped stabilize a young and at that time still fragile but productive sub-
discipline, namely cultural anthropology, 
c)  it was a historical precondition for contemporary co-evolutionary theories, 
productive approaches to specific problems regarding how culture and 
nature interact on the evolutionary level. 
 
To conclude: There are then cases where it is more useful, in the service of 
scientific productivity, to batten down the hatches of one’s scientific horizon—
for a while at least. Sometimes it is fruitful to separate oneself: to ignore, for 
specific goals, that everything in reality hangs together in complex ways and 
that therefore nothing is autonomous.  
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The argument from fruitful separation is a general one (applying to the 
relationship between all kinds of phenomena and fields attached to 
phenomena), but it entails a more specific argument, specific to the relationship 
between nature and culture. The divide between nature and culture can be an 
epistemic mean for fruitful research in that it provides disciplinary primitives 
that allow for fruitful separation of kinds of explanations typical of a discipline 
or field. It is thus epistemically justified even though in the world everything 
hangs together and is on a par. 
 
 
5. “It takes two to tango” and integration as regulative ideal  
Over the long run, it certainly takes two to tango, i.e., separation and 
integration must be in a dialectic balance with each other in order to get ahead 
in a specific field, i.e., to reach an “oscillatory progress” (Holton 2010: 249). Or, 
as Hans-Jörg Rheinberger (1997: 253) wrote: “Fragmentation, aiming at 
simplicity, finally creates complexity”—a managable, palpable complexity 
instead of an undifferentiated one. Those who draw distinctions first and 
connect later, see more.  
If separation and integration are in the long run both necessary for the 
generativity of science, they should have in principle equal value. But the 
philosophical literature by and large seems to still place a higher priority on 
integration (or “unification” as some still prefer to call it). It is a higher, if not 
the ultimate “regulative ideal” (Kitcher 1999) of science, a higher-level norm. As 
a regulative ideal, it is, according to Philip Kitcher (1999: 342), “good where we 
can get it, but not to be imposed willy-nilly.” There are contexts where we 
should not apply it. Richard Burian (1993) defended a similar nuanced position, 
taking separation as transiently useful in certain contexts. He writes: “It is a 
matter of judgment when to take the norm seriously. … But this in no way 
undercuts the legitimacy of unification as a generally applicable higher-level 
norm” (Burian 1993: 314). 
Kitcher and Burian are on the right track but miss the crucial point 
nonetheless. The context in which separation or integration can be useful 
includes a specific way of understanding the phenomenon at issue. Burian thus 
formulates the higher-level norm also as a conditional: “when work in different 
disciplines bears on a given problem, their practices, terminologies, and 
standards for evaluation of experimental evidence must be brought into accord 
with respect to the matter at hand for it to count as satisfactorily solved” 
(Burian 1993: 313; emphasis added). Well, problems are not simply “given.” 
They are reconstituted, as in Kroeber‘s case, so that there is a functioning 
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division of labor. Kroeber reconstituted culture in a way so that it allows the 
autonomy of cultural anthropology.  
Burian in principle recognizes this option (and he seems to be the only one in 
the literature on the value of unity or integration): problems and phenomena 
can be reconstituted so that there is no need to integrate knowledge from 
diverse disciplines. “Ultimately,” Burian writes, only one of the following 
options has to be fulfilled in an interdisciplinary encounter: “(1) achieve 
coherence between different scientific descriptions of the phenomena of 
concern and also between those descriptions and any theoretical explanations 
of those phenomena, or (2) transform the problem of concern so as to remove 
the obligation to take into account one or more of the competing descriptions or 
theories” (Burian 1993: 302-3).15 Even though he thus admits that separation 
and integration are on a par, two distinct ultimate research strategies, he 
regards separation as a makeshift: a good strategy if things get too complex.16 
Unity stays the regulative ideal. This ignores that separation can be permanent 
without preventing local integration. Local integration can consist in the 
integration of knowledge for a concrete problem or stabilize itself as a new 
interfield (to solve a specific type of problem). To consider separation and 
integration as of equal value means allowing for a permanent separation 
without denying that at certain points there should be local integration.17 
Stressing that separation is permanent does not imply that priority is given 
to separation. Giving priority to separation would involve claiming that only if 
there is no division-of-labor that allows one to reconstitute a phenomenon, 
should one look for integration. No such claim has been defended here. The 
differentiation of disciplines historically correlates with a tremendous increase 
in knowledge. This could be taken as evidence that separation is more 
important than integration. Yet, there is evidence in the other direction too: As a 
regulative ideal separation (with integration as makeshift) would lead to an 
indefinite proliferation of problems and would lower the probability that errors 
are found via integration (thanks to its corrective force). Science, after all, is a 
systematic knowledge production endeavor and is robust thanks to its network-
like structure. In a network, separation and integration are of equal value.  
                                            
15 Burian even gives a similar example: “One way of transforming a problem is by dividing it 
into strongly separate problems. For example, the rejection of Haeckel’s biogenetic law facilitat-
ed just such a separation between the problem of determining the causes of evolution and the 
problem of establishing phylogenies.” (Burian 1993: 303) 
16 The same holds for Kitcher’s “modest unificationism.” Kitcher (1999) admits that there is no 
“fixed totality of questions,” but does not consider the consequences of this for separation as 
equally valuable. Van der Steen (1993) also deplores a synthesis bias. I agree with Steen on the 
diagnoses, but not with the therapy.  
17 Closest to my account is thus Mitchell (2003, 2009). 
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Kroeber (1948: 260) postulated a similar network structure for culture, and 
depicted it, as in Figure 2: as a tree–at that time the most conventional depiction 
of differentiating structures. He described it as the “tree of [the knowledge of 
good and evil—that is, of human] culture” and wrote of its form: “There is a 
constant branching-out, but the branches also grow together again, wholly or 
partially, all the time. Culture diverges, but it syncretizes and anastomoses too” 
(ibid.). Science too is a form of culture that evolves as a system of inheritance of 
knowledge with differentiation and local integration.  
 
Figure 2: Kroeber’s tree of knowledge (from Kroeber 1948: 260).  
 
 
Conclusion 
As long as separation is paired with later integration, it can result in fruitful 
scientific results since (if successful) it elucidates phenomena and is in that 
sense of epistemic value. The separationist strategy is a piecemeal heuristic but 
a fruitful one, as is the integrationist strategy. We can thus consider it as a good 
thing that there are different kinds of experts devoted to their “own” kind of 
causes, so that there is partial knowledge (from studying one factor in isolation, 
i.e., while the others are ignored) that can later be integrated. In the long run, 
science needs both separation of disciplines like evolutionary biology, 
psychology, cultural anthropology, philosophy etc., and it needs integration.  
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